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CONSTRAINT AND CONFESSION
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER*
I. FROM THE SUSPECT'S PSYCHE TO THE CONSTABLE'S CONDUCT
Country lawyers are often better philosophers than philosophers are. Most
lawyers have known for a long time that the term coercion cannot be defined,
that judges place this label on results for many diverse reasons, and that the
word coercion metamorphoses remarkably with the factual circumstances in
which legal actors press it into service.
This article focuses on the constitutional requirement that confessions be
voluntary. Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel have written that this re-
quirement bars the admission of confessions "(i) which are of doubtful reli-
ability because of the practices used to obtain them; (ii) which were obtained
by offensive police practices even if reliability is not in question ... ; or (iii)
which were obtained under circumstances in which the defendant's free choice
was significantly impaired, even if the police did not resort to offensive prac-
tices."2
As I see it, LaFave and Israel's second category says it all. Courts should
define the term coerced confession to mean a confession caused by offensive
governmental conduct, period. They should enter a suspect's mind only insofar
as they must to resolve the causation inquiry. Shifting their attention almost
entirely from the minds of suspects to the conduct of government officers,
courts should abandon the search for "overborne wills" and attempts to assess
the quality of individual choices?
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor at the University of Chicago Law School. A.B., 1962, Har-
vard College; LL.B., 1965, Harvard Law School. I am grateful for the comments of Stephen
Schulhofer, Christopher Slobogin, George Thomas, and Welsh White and for the research support
of the Russell Baker Scholars Fund at the University of Chicago Law School and the John Simon
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation.
1. See ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOV-
ERNING POWER 109-33 (1952). Alan Wertheimer says that a "crucial defect of the philosophical
literature on coercion" is its "insufficient sensitivity to the contextual character of coercion
claims." ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 181 (1987). Although Wertheimer is a political scientist
and a philosopher, he is enough of a country lawyer (honorary) to overcome this failing. Even
Wertheimer, however, like Robert Nozick, Joseph Raz, and virtually every other contemporary
philosopher who has addressed the subject of coercion, treats the distinction between threats and
offers as crucial to an understanding of the concept. See id. at 202. Although the threat-offer dis-
tinction is appropriate in many contexts, this article notes that lawyers and judges have disregard-
ed it in coerced confession cases for more than two hundred years. The article contends, more-
over, that they were wise to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 48-63. In at least this one
doctrinal comer, I believe that country lawyers have developed a sounder understanding of the
context-specific issues than philosophers have.
2. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE § 6.2(b), at 295
(1985).
3. The Supreme Court has characterized the issue in coerced confession cases as whether
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The constitutional law governing the admission of confessions has in fact
devoted less attention over time to the state of mind of confessing suspects
and increased attention to the propriety of governmental conduct.4 I advocate
the final step in this progression.5 An exclusionary rule applicable to the prod-
ucts of improper governmental conduct should mark the full extent of the
coerced confession doctrine embodied in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the full extent of the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination as well.6 After identifying constitutionally improper
conduct, courts should apply ordinary principles of causation to determine the
evidentiary consequences of this conduct! Just as courts exclude evidence
(including confessions) derived from unreasonable searches and seizures, they
should reject evidence derived from improper interrogation techniques. The
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments require no more and no less.
The Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Colorado v. Connelly' was a land-
mark in the Court's shift from suspect-focused standards of coercion to police-
focused standards.9 LaFave and Israel recognize that Connelly effectively
eliminated their third category of involuntary confession cases-those in which
"the defendant's free choice was significantly impaired even if the police did
the defendant's "will was overborne." See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978); Lynunmn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963);
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576 (1961); id. at 602 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884); see also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (de-
claring that courts must assess the effect of interrogation practices on the "mind and will of the
accused"); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. Ctu. L. REV. 174, 182 (1988); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and
the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 885-86 (1979); Welsh S. White, Confessions In-
duced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE LJ. 947, 951 (1994).
4. Yale Kamisar suggested as early as 1963 that the Supreme Court's talk about overborne
wills might conceal its approval and disapproval of particular interrogation techniques. Yale
Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary Confession?: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RuTGERs L. REV. 728 (1963), reprinted in YALE KAMISAR,
POUCE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND PoLIcY 14 (1980) [hereinafter
KAMISAR, ESSAYS].
5. Short of gratuitously penalizing improper police conduct that did not cause a suspect's
confession.
6. For an argument that this position accords with the historic purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, see Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right
to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996).
7. In judging the reach of exclusionary rules in criminal cases, courts usually speak of
"derivative evidence," see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984), and "the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree," see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 298 (1985), rather than of "proximate cause."
They ask whether the "taint of the primary illegality has dissipated," see United States v. Cox, 475
F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1973), rather than whether an "independent intervening cause" has broken
the causal chain. So far as I can tell, this departure from the terminology used in other legal areas
marks no departure in the principles applied. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487-88 (1963) (recognizing that even when wrongful governmental conduct is a "but-for" cause of
a confession, a suspect's decision to confess may qualify as an independent intervening cause);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (recognizing that courts follow the consequences of pur-
poseful police misconduct further than they do the consequences of inadvertent misconduct).
8. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
9. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) ("[C]ertain interrogation techniques,
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offen-




not resort to offensive practices."' In essence, Connelly distinguished mental
incapacity from coercion. Connelly held that as long as governmental officers
have not induced a mentally ill suspect's confession, the Constitution poses no
bar to admitting this confession in evidence.
In my view, pre-Connelly efforts to assess whether confessions were the
product of free will were always misguided-incoherent in concept,
unadministerable in practice, and incompatible with our general understanding
of the Bill of Rights as a body of restraints on improper governmental con-
duct.' One can, if one likes, find sufficient governmental action to satisfy the
governmental-action requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
simply in the admission at trial of a mentally disturbed person's confes-
sion-but I do not know why one would want to. Especially in a constitutional
system incorporating the principle that "the trial of all Crimes... shall be by
Jury,""2 permitting a jury rather than a judge to assess the evidentiary value
of a confession obtained without governmental misconduct seems fully com-
patible with due process. 3
I do not quarrel with LaFave and Israel's first category of involuntary
confessions--confessions "of doubtful reliability because of the practices used
to obtain them"--so long as one underlines the phrase "because of the practic-
es used to obtain them." The propriety of police practices should be judged ex
ante from the perspective of the officer or officers whose conduct is chal-
lenged. Courts should consider a confessing suspect's mental condition only
insofar as the interrogating officer had reason to know it.'4
Just as the Constitution does not mandate the exclusion of unreliable
eyewitness testimony, it does not mandate the exclusion of unreliable confes-
sions. An almost blind witness may tell a jury she saw the defendant commit a
crime despite the fact she previously gave four inconsistent statements and has
been convicted of perjury five times. The Constitution requires the exclusion
of unreliable eyewitness testimony only when improper governmental con-
duct-for example, an impermissibly suggestive police line-up---has produced
it.1
5
The rule should be no different for unreliable confessions.'6 Unless im-
10. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, § 6.2(b), at 296.
11. See George C. Thomas Im, A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5
YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 79, 85 (1993) ("mhe Framers were concerned about purposive, govern-
mental coercion .... If the government did not coerce the confession, concluding that [a suspect]
acted unfreely does not seem to be adequate grounds for exclusion.").
12. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2.
13. In Connelly, the auditory hallucinations of a mentally ill killer directed him either to
commit suicide or to confess. He then confessed to a uniformed officer on a downtown Denver
street Connelly, 479 U.S. at 161. His case was little different from one in which an insane person
writes a letter to the police department admitting his crimes. See George C. Thomas I & Mar-
shall D. Bilder, Criminal Law: Aristotle's Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 261 n.95 (1991) (reporting the comments of Yale Kamisar).
14. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65 (noting that the police were unaware of the defendant's
mental illness at the time of his confession and recognizing that a police officer's exploitation of
known mental disabilities may require exclusion of a suspect's confession).
15. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
16. But see George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987
1997]
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proper governmental conduct has generated a confession, the Constitution
should give the defendant only a right to present evidence of the confession's
unreliability to the jury. 7 With few exceptions, the Constitution makes juries
the appropriate judges of the probative value of evidence in criminal cases."
II. FREE WILL AFrER THE KILLING OF GOD
Having sketched my general position on the law of confessions, I want to
speak in equally general terms about the concept of coercion, the subject of
this Symposium." On its face, this concept affirms the freedom of the human
will. Its apparent purpose is to identify exceptional situations in which both
moral theory and law should abandon their otherwise pervasive assumption of
free will.
Belief in the capacity of responsible adults to choose has been a central
tenet of Western thought from the beginning.20 As Herbert Morris has ob-
served, human beings have regarded themselves as capable of creating, among
other things, themselves. Morris notes "the inestimable value to each of us of
having the responses of others to us determined over a wide range of our lives
by what we choose rather than what they choose.' Presuming our power to
choose serves us better than the alternative. Moreover, I believe this premise
passes more than a pragmatic or consequentialist test of truth. My sense of
your freedom and mine rests, however, on an amalgam of fuzzy
things--empirical observation, emotional knowledge, reflection on the psycho-
logical impossibility of making an assumption of determinism, and faith in the
ultimate order of the universe. At best, my belief in people's capacity to
choose is the product of what philosophers call reflective equilibrium or infer-
ence to the best explanation; the question is not susceptible to hogchoker
proof. To some extent, in the words of an Iris Dement song, we must let the
mystery be.'
When the premise of free will itself rests on squishy foundations, the task
Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 275-76 (1988) (calling the Connelly result "insup-
portable" and declaring, "[A] total deconstitutionalization of traditionally important reliability is-
sues is unjustified"); Yale Kamisar, Response: On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 946 (1995) (maintaining that
Connelly overemphasized "the police methods rationale").
17. More than 40 years ago, Bernard Meltzer thought it obvious that a confession could be
voluntary even if it were the product of hallucination. He noted that the evidentiary requirement
that confessions be corroborated rests on the fear of "false, albeit voluntary confessions." Bernard
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U.
Cn. L. REV. 317, 320 & n.15 (1954).
18. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 (The reliability of a confession "is a matter to be gov-
erned by the evidentiary laws of the forum... and not by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
19. Symposium, Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Coercion, Exploitation, and
the Law, 74 DENv. U. L. REV. 875 (1997).
20. See 3 ARISTOTLE, ETHICS § 1 (A. Wardman & J. Creed trans., 1963); PLATO, THE RE-
PUBLIC 250 (F. M. Cornford trans., 1945) (attributing to human beings "an element of free choice,
which makes us, and not Heaven, responsible for the good and evil in our lives").
21. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 486 (1968).
22. bus DEMENT, Let the Mystery Be, in SONGS OF IRIS (Forerunner Music, Inc.), recorded
on IRIS DEMENT, INFAMOUS ANGEL (Rounder Records Corp. 1992).
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of identifying deterministic exceptions is daunting. Indeed, anyone who pur-
ports to separate willed from determined transactions must be either God or an
idiot.23 The attempt of postmodernists to deconstruct the consent-coercion
dualism draws on the difficulty of drawing even an intelligible line between
the two categories. For all we know, every desire may be learned, and all of
our desires may be the products of our culture.
From a postmodernist perspective, the consent-coercion dualism is merely
an attempt to remain on good terms with God after killing Her.24 At the close
of the twentieth century, postmodernist scholars have heard Jean Paul Sartre
clearly: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being-like a worm."'  Al-
though we are the far from divine products of heredity, environment, random
breeding, and Darwinian struggle,26 they declare, we treat some choices as
voluntary, and we sanctify them. We treat other choices as involuntary, and
we say these choices don't count. We use this rhetoric to preserve an illusion
of freedom, although we know we aren't free. Our desire for new cars, CDs,
and microwave ovens may be simply the product of an addiction (the goods-
addiction of our consumeristic society) and no more the product of our wills
than a heroin addict's craving for her drug.27
23. 1 do not contend that courts can always avoid messy, mind-boggling inquiries into free
will. The duress defense in criminal cases requires examination of whether a reasonable person
could have resisted the unlawful pressure to which a defendant was subjected, and courts must
assess individual mental capacity in contested will cases and other cases. Situations in which
courts must assess only the mental or moral responsibility of an allegedly coerced actor seem very
different from those in which they should focus as much or more on the legal rights or moral
entitlements of an allegedly coercing party.
In judging the voluntariness of a confession under the Constitution, I believe that the all-
but-exclusive focus should be on the conduct of the governmental officers alleged to have pro-
duced the confession, and on the government's entitlement to receive this confession in evidence.
But see WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 110 (claiming that when Supreme Court confession deci-
sions focus on either police misconduct or reliability they disregard "the core of the voluntariness
principle, namely, the protection of the autonomy of the agent").
Similarly, I suspect that the free will inquiry is unproductive in contract duress cas-
es-cases in which courts ought again to focus primarily on the conduct of the allegedly coercing
party. In fact, however, courts focus more often on the subjective effect of the alleged coercion.
See, e.g., Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 1970) (defining du-
ress as a threat that "'has left the individual bereft of the quality of mind essential to the making
of a contract"' (quoting Kaplan v. Kaplan, 182 N.E.2d 706, 709 (I. 1962)); Wolf v. Marlton
Corp., 154 A.2d 625, 628 (NJ. Super. 1959) ("'[Dluress is tested, not by the nature of the threats,
but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim"' (quoting Rubenstein v. Rubenstein,
120 A.2d 11, 15 (NJ. 1956)). Terms like duress and coercion do seem to focus on individual
agency or autonomy, but unbending linguistic precision could threaten the ability of the concept of
voluntariness to serve its protean purposes. See supra note I and accompanying text.
24. Compare Justice Holmes's remark in a letter to Alice Stopford Green: "I said to a lady at
dinner the other night that morals were a contrivance of man to take himself seriously, which
means that the philosophers... make them ... an excuse for their pretention to be on the ground
floor and personal friends of God." Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Feb. 7,
1909) (quoted in Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes's Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 703, 721
(1992)).
25. JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ONTOLOGY 26 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1966).
26. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 465 (1897)
("The postulate on which we think about the universe is that there is a fixed quantitative relation
between every phenomenon and its antecedents and consequents. If there is such a thing as a
phenomenon without these fixed quantitative relations, it is a miracle.").
27. See Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem
1997]
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One can talk this way when one is in a funk, drunk, in France, or at a
university, but the problem with deconstructing the consent-coercion dualism
is that we need it. Few postmodernists have advocated permitting a robber to
demand money in exchange for his victim's life. At the same time, few have
proposed to block a worker from trading an apple for an orange at lunchtime.
The lunchtime exchange appears beneficial to most of us even if the apple-
preferring worker, had she been raised in California, might have preferred
oranges. Law and the business of living require a means of distinguishing the
workers' exchange from the exchange between the robber and his victim. As
the postmodernists remind us, the line between consensual and nonconsensual
transactions is not foreordained; it is not pre-political; we may draw it as we
like. Until the postmodernists suggest a better way to draw it, however, they
give us little reason to listen to them.
People who seek to distinguish coerced from consensual transactions by
probing the minds of consenting parties may, however, be less convincing than
the postmodernists. One might initially attempt to define coercion as any irre-
sistible or overwhelming inducement-an offer from Don Corleone that you
cannot refuse. The Supreme Court apparently invokes this basic concept of
coercion when it treats the issue in coerced confession cases as whether the
defendant's will was overborne.28 In psychological terms, however, an offer
to buy your house for one hundred times its market value may overwhelm you
more than a threat to wreck the birdbath on your lawn unless you pay protec-
tion money. No one calls an offer coercive because it is so astonishingly gen-
erous that one has difficulty resisting it. Moreover, the attempt to distinguish
irresistible proposals from proposals that merely are not resisted is mind-bog-
gling-a task better left to God. The difference between the homebuyer's
proposal and the vandal's lies in our evaluation of the moral character of the
two proposals. This difference is the difference between a promise and a
threat. It has nothing to do with the strength of the homeowner's power to
resist."
Abandoning the Godfather's definition of coercion as an offer that one
cannot refuse and recognizing the need to distinguish promises from threats,
one might take the opposite tack: The problem is not that some offers are
irresistible but that one would rather not receive some of them at all.' It usu-
of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 173 (1990) ("Much of modem social sci-
ence, political theory, philosophy, and literary theory attempts to demonstrate that desires and be-
liefs are inevitably intersubjective and social. It is not meaningful to talk about disembodied pref-
erences."). MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRrrCAL LEGAL STUDIEs 20-21 (1987) (suggesting that
a question of duress arises in every contracts case because "it is an open question ... whether the
contract would have been made had each party had other physically imaginable though socially
unavailable options accessible to him"). But see WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 261 ("Those who
argue ... that socialization limits freedom would do well to remember that not everything about a
person or his condition can be said to limit his freedom without devouring the self who is capable
of being constrained and whose freedom is to be valued.").
28. See supra note 3.
29. See WERTHEtMER, supra note 1, at 204 ("It is important to see that the distinction be-
tween threats and offers is not a function of the distance between the options or their efficacy in
securing the desired response.").
30. See KELMAN, supra note 27, at 22 (attributing to Robert Nozick the view that "[a]n offer
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ally does not make your day to hear someone say, "Your money or your life."
This offer is far less likely to spark a smile than, "Want to trade an apple for
an orange?" Once a robber has drawn his gun, however, the option of paying
him off usually becomes one you want. Deciding whether to evaluate the
gunman's action at the moment it becomes beneficial or at an earlier moment
is a task of normative judgment. This judgment has nothing to do with the
victim's psyche.
One might try to resolve this question of temporal vantage point by taking
the gunman's actions as a whole: Has everything the offeror has done made
the person whom he has allegedly coerced better off or worse off? The
gunman's victim probably would rather not have met the gunman at all; she
might even prefer that he had died when he was young. A worker with no
taste for the apple in her lunchbox, however, is grateful both for the birth and
for the later appearance in the lunch room of a co-worker willing to supply an
orange in trade.
This approach has bite (pardon the metaphor amidst these fruit
hypotheticals) in situations that initially may seem problematic. If you were
dying in the desert, you would welcome the appearance of a monopolist with a
canteen of water even if the monopolist charged you $1000 per sip. The
monopolist's offer would make you better off (assuming you had this kind of
cash), and it would therefore be inappropriate (not to mention unappreciative)
to call his offer coercive.
If this approach were sound, however, the subject of this paper would be
easy. All bargained guilty pleas and many confessions would be involuntary.
The police officer who arrests you before she obtains your confession, the
prosecutor who files a charge against you before she bargains for your guilty
plea, and the government that these officials represent are in one respect like
the gunman: All of them make you worse off before they make you better off
(if they truly make you better off at all). A criminal suspect usually would
prefer not to have met them and might even wish them vaporized. What dif-
ferentiates the government's proposition from the gunman's is not that the
government's conduct, judged as a whole, makes the suspect better off. The
difference, if there is one, is, that the injury threatened by the government,
unlike that threatened by the gunman, is not wrongful.3' The line between
threats and promises is normative, and it must be drawn from the perspective
of a detached observer.
is a proposition the promisor would choose to receive whether he accepts it or not, a threat a
proposition the promisor would sooner never have heard").
31. For reasons why, in confession cases, governmental threats and promises should be treat-
ed as wrongful and coercive, however, see infra text accompanying notes 48-63.
Joseph Raz writes, "Coercive threats differ from offers... in that the former reduce the
options available to the person to whom they are addressed whereas offers never worsen and often
improve them." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORAUiTY OF FREEDOM 150 (1986). This statement is accurate
only if the baseline for determining whether options are reduced or enhanced is normative and/or
sociological (options that a person is entitled to have or reasonably expects to have) rather than
the status quo ante (options that a person has in fact prior to the offer or threat). See infra text
accompanying notes 41-47; WERTHEnMER, supra note 1, at 205 ("In defining [an offeree's] base-
line, we do not take a high-speed snapshot of [the offeree's] present state of affairs.").
19971
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Of course, even after one recognizes the need for moral evaluation of a
threat or offer, problematic cases are likely to remain problematic. At most,
one may gain a clearer understanding of why these cases are difficult and
what the moral issue is. If a monopolist's moral duty is to offer a canteen of
water to a dying person out of charity or to sell it at what medieval Christians
would have called a fair price, a threat to withhold the canteen until the mo-
nopolist receives $100,000 is coercive. If, however, the only test of a fair price
is what the buyer is willing to pay, the monopolist's offer is noncoercive.
However one resolves this normative issue, it is the moral character of the
threat or offer and not the offeree's mental state that determines the permissi-
bility of the transaction.32
To some extent echoing Kant3 and Hume,' Harry Frankfurt maintains
that a person is unfree when he "acts against the will he wants."35 People
have mental states about their mental states, and when a person's actions
accord with a "first-order desire" but not with a "second-order desire" not to
have the "first-order desire," she is not free.3 6 Frankfurt's paradigm--the case
that most closely approximates his model-is the drug addict who wants a
narcotic but regrets wanting it. Endorsing Frankfurt's approach, George C.
Thomas and Marshall D. Bilder treat a confession as involuntary when a sus-
pect wants to confess but does not want to want to confess.
The Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder approach sounds like double-talk to unso-
phisticated country lawyers, 38 but I understand what it means. For example, I
acted contrary to my second-order desire to sit in a front-row seat at a Chica-
go Bulls game when, because of the constraining circumstances of my salary,
I sat in an obstructed-vision seat instead. I must have wanted to sit in the
obstructed-vision seat because I bought the ticket, but I did not want to want
to. Given the state of my wallet, I simply could not help myself. Being far
less rich than Donald Trump is contrary to my sense of self, and I regretted
both my choice and the circumstances that prompted it.
Perhaps this example trivializes the Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder insight; a
second-order desire probably must be a desire more crucial to one's identity
than a wish to sit close to a sporting event. Thirty years ago, however, I be-
32. This is not to deny that the foreseeable effect of an offer on an offeree's psyche may be
relevant in assessing its moral character.
33. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 633 (Norman K. Smith trans., 1965);
IMMANUEL KANT, PROLEGOMENA TO ANY FUrURE METAPHYSICS § 53 (Paul Carus trans., 1949).
34. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING § VIII (1953).
35. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 47-57 (1988).
36. Id.
37. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 270-71. Thomas and Bilder do not contend that
Frankfurt's approach provides a workable standard for identifying individual involuntary confes-
sions. They do, however, defend the presumption of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
that all confessions produced by custodial interrogation are involuntary on the ground that sus-
pects who do not volunteer confessions generally have a second-order desire not to want to want
to confess. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 270-71.
38. It is also inconsistent with the economist's concept of revealed preferences-the idea that
a person reveals what she wants by what she does. For a hard-nosed economist or a country law-
yer, it is the bottom line that counts. Saying that you want to do something but that you do not
want to want to do it is just whining.
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trayed myself more seriously. As I interviewed a judge in Houston about
racism in the criminal justice system, he asked me gleefully, "Do you want to
see a picture of the first all-nigger jury in the State of Texas?" Because I did
not wish to disrupt a revealing interview, I gulped and said, "Sure." Did I
want to want to see the judge's souvenir? I regretted countenancing and en-
couraging his racism and felt that I had abandoned an important principle.
Although I knew that I had resolved an ethical issue in a dubious way, it
did not occur to me that my choice was unfree. I was pleased to learn from
Frankfurt-Thomas-Bilder that it was. It is not clear, however, why the law of
confessions should respect a criminal suspect whose sense of self depends on
not admitting his wrongdoing. This suspect may be a murderer whose second-
order desires to get away with his crimes and to continue his killing are really
rotten. Besides, even if a suspect does not want to want to confess, he may
not want to not want to want to confess.39 In the end, what most unsophisti-
cated country lawyers would say about Harry Frankfurt's first-order and sec-
ond-order desires seems about right.'
People who attempt to define coercion or constraint in terms of an
offeree's subjective mental state are somewhat like the postmodemists; they
take the business of assessing the existence or nonexistence of free will too
seriously. These psychics attempt the impossible while the postmodemists,
recognizing the impossibility of the task, abandon the line-drawing effort alto-
gether. Both groups fail to recognize the extent to which our talk of free will
has missed the mark. The critical issue in coercion cases is usually not the
offeree's state of mind but the propriety or impropriety of the offeror's influ-
ences on her choice.
Our first intuition may be that a gunman deprives his victim of free will.
This intuition, however, confronts a difficulty that has been recognized for so
long that George Thomas and Marshall Bilder call it "Aristotle's paradox." '
Handing over one's wallet is not like being pushed into a wall; one chooses to
do it (just as anyone who confesses makes a conscious decision to confess42).
The decision to part with one's property rather than suffer the gunman's vio-
lence belongs to the victim alone, and she may choose between these limited
alternatives as she likes.43 Our indignation at the robber's treatment of the
victim has little to do with the victim's lack of free will. This indignation
arises simply because the robber has unfairly restricted his victim's range of
39. For an apparently serious discussion of this possibility, see FRANKFURT, supra note 35,
at 21.
40. The concept of first-order and second-order preferences does make sense in some con-
texts-for example, that in which a dieter asks a friend not to give him cheesecake even if he
begs (asks the friend, in other words, to honor his second-order rather than his first-order desire).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 1129
(1986).
41. Thomas & Bilder, supra note 13, at 244; see ARIsTOrLE, supra note 20, at § 1.
42. Wigmore wrote that "all conscious utterances are and must be voluntary," adding that
"as between the rack and a false confession, the latter would usually be considered the less dis-
agreeable; but it is nonetheless voluntary." 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMroucAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENcE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 824 (2d ed. 1923).
43. See Don Locke, Three Concepts of Free Action: I, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 97, 109 (J.
Fisher ed., 1986).
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choice. All of us have fewer options than we'd like, but the victim has even
fewer than the rest of us."4 And notice what's happened: In a sentence or
two, we have moved from assessing the victim's state of mind to judging the
morality of the robber's conduct. Fortunately, this more critical issue is also
more tractable.
If the gunman's victim is like me, she will give the gunman her wallet in
a panic without rational deliberation. If she is like Indiana Jones, she will hand
over the wallet coolly while considering whether there may be a way to turn
the tables before the transaction ends. If she is a master of stoic philosophy,
she may even be emotionally indifferent to whether she lives or dies. Her
emotional state and how much or how wisely she deliberates before delivering
her wallet do not matter at all. Whatever the victim's state of mind, the robber
has coerced her. His wrongful threat induced her to hand over her wallet, and
that is all we need to know.'5
One may envision a spectrum of differing degrees of impairment of voli-
tion with the apple-orange exchange at one end and the delivery of one's
wallet to a gunman at the other, but the metaphor is misleading. The choice
between sacrificing a wallet and sacrificing one's life sometimes may be as
volitional as the choice between eating an apple and eating an orange. The
gunman, however, has unfairly restricted the "opportunity set" within which
his victim may use her volition. Rather than crawl inside an offeree's mind,
one can envision a range of more severe and less severe restrictions of an
individual's opportunity set. One can then consider the fairness or unfairness
of the human actions alleged to make this person's choice involuntary.
The case of Adam, whose dentist recently sued him to recover fees for
two dental procedures, underlines the nature of the inquiry. This case began
when Adam awoke one day with a toothache. He went to his dentist who
pulled the tooth. Adam later refused to pay the dentist's bill, claiming that his
contract with the dentist was involuntary. He said that his terrible toothache
had denied him any choice in the matter. A judge rejected Adam's contention,
and the dentist recovered her fee.
The dentist, however, did not recover her fee for the second procedure.
Immediately after her extraction of the tooth, she told Adam that his teeth
needed cleaning. Adam replied that he did not want her to clean his teeth. The
dentist then grabbed Adam's arm, pulled it behind his back, and twisted it
hard. Adam screamed in pain, reconsidered his position, and asked the dentist
to clean his teeth. He once more claimed that his contract with the dentist was
involuntary, and, this time, the judge agreed with him.
Adam's twisted arm was, however, less painful than his aching tooth. His
44. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 1, at 10.
45. A tougher case might be one in which a wrongful threat causes an action that the alleg-
edly coerced actor does not regret or even welcomes. Don Locke suggests the case of a pilot
flying to Omaha who is directed by a gunman to fly to Cuba instead. The pilot secretly prefers
Cuba and is delighted that he will be able to visit his mistress in Havana. See Locke, supra note
43, at 100. For the purposes that matter to country lawyers---deciding whether the pilot should be
punished criminally or held civilly liable for breach of contract-I have no difficulty concluding
that he has been coerced.
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subjective sense of constraint-his sense that he had "no choice" but to em-
ploy the dentist-was stronger in the case that he lost than in the case that he
won. The distinction between these cases rests on the fact that a wrongful
human action had induced the second contract but not the first. To speak of an
overbome will rarely helps to resolve the issues in dental cases or confession
cases. A better focus is the propriety or impropriety of human influences on
choice.
Not all improper influences, however, may qualify as coercion. When a
bribe paid to a senator has improperly influenced her vote, we usually do not
say that this bribe coerced the senator. The bribe was an improper influence
on the senator's choice, but we confine the language of coercion to threats (for
example, a threat to vandalize the senator's birdbath) and do not use it to
include promises.
The normative distinction between threats and promises is captured only
crudely by those words. As a linguistic matter, any proposal for a trade can be
tagged with either term. A promise to pay for an automobile includes a threat
not to pay unless the automobile is provided, and the threat "your money or
your life" includes a promise to spare your life in exchange for your cash. In
normative discourse, however, the threat-promise distinction invokes a norma-
tive baseline. One could call this starting point "the normal set of human
expectations and entitlements," "the normal human opportunity set," or simply
"the normal human condition." A gunman's threat narrows normal expecta-
tions-it worsens the normal condition-while an offer to buy a house for ten
times its market value (or to pay a juicy bribe) expands them. The concept of
the normal condition is partly descriptive and partly evaluative.' People's
sense of fair treatment and entitlement are strongly influenced by what hap-
pens to others. Indeed, a purely sociological concept of the "normal" condition
effectively marks the relevant baseline when social practices and expectations
are clear. Nevertheless, the specification of the appropriate baseline is in the
end a normative task.4' When new ethical issues arise, when old ethical is-
sues arise only rarely, and when social practice does not establish a clear base-
line, it is everyone for herself: What is the fair price for the only bottle of
water in the desert? What should the purchaser be able to expect from the
monopolist with a full canteen?
1I1. THE REAL IssuEs IN CONFESSION CASES
Although the distinction between threats and promises shapes the law of
coercion in other contexts, it has been unimportant in confession cases. Eigh-
teenth century English decisions held inadmissible confessions obtained "by
46. Joel Feinberg observes that one may use either a "statistical" or a "moral" test to mark
the relevant baseline. JoEL FEINBERG, HARM To SELF 219 (1986). For reasons explained in the
text, I believe that the two tests blend together in practice.
47. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue that reaches a more ambiguous conclusion, see
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in P-nIosoHy, PoLrIcs, AND SocIErY 101, 115-16 (Peter Lasleti et al.
eds., 1972); see also WERTHiMER, supra note 1, at 212 (advocating the use of multiple baselines
and apparently treating each as equally legitimate). But see id. at 217, 242 (treating the "moral"
baseline as primary or determinative in most situations).
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promises of favour." The United States Supreme Court's first coerced con-
fession decision, Hopt v. Utah,49 said in 1884 that a confession, to be volun-
tary, must be "uninfluenced by hope of reward or fear of punishment."' In
1896, the Supreme Court declared a confession "inadmissible if made under
any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor."'" One year lat-
er-one hundred years ago-the Court placed what earlier had been a com-
mon law rule of evidence on a constitutional foundation. In Bram v. United
States,2 the Court invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination and said that a confession could not be received in evidence
unless it was "free and voluntary; that is, must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight . . .,,"
Although the Supreme Court now has abandoned Bram's unqualified
prohibition of promises of leniency,54 the Court has not limited its concept of
coercion to threats. If a police officer were to pay a suspect $10,000 to con-
fess, the Court apparently would hold the suspect's confession involuntary."5
I said at the outset that courts should definethe term coerced confession
to mean a confession caused by offensive governmental conduct.56 This defi-
nition collapses both the distinction between threats and promises and the dis-
tinction between duress and fraud. In that respect, it accords with traditional
law. Judges lose little by calling at least some lies and some promises coercive
while they gain the ability to assess all improper influences on choice under
one rubric. Treating threats, promises, deception, and all other improper influ-
ences under the heading of coercion permits courts to consider what the Su-
preme Court calls "the totality of the circumstances" in every case.57
Asking whether a proposal broadens or narrows the normal human oppor-
tunity set may be helpful in some contexts, but it is not helpful in confession
cases. First, in a world in which promises of leniency are permitted, the base-
line for distinguishing threats from promises is impossible to discern. Offi-
cials-judges, prosecutors, police officers, sentencing commissioners, and leg-
islators-are naturally reluctant to punish too leniently offenders who confess
48. See Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (Cr. Cas. 1783); Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep.
1114, 1116 (1775) (Mansfield, J.).
49. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
50. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584.
51. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896).
52. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
53. Bran, 168 U.S. at 542-43.
54. It did so first in guilty plea cases, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970), and
then in out-of-court confession cases, Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (declaring
that Bram "does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession").
55. When the Court abandoned its categorical disapproval of confessions induced by prom-
ises of leniency, it endorsed a test of voluntariness that condemned "promises that are by their
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." Brady,
397 U.S. at 755.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3. Of course coercion cannot always be defined in
terms of improper human influences on choice, for coercion is not always improper. Our law
appropriately coerces all of us not to kill or steal.




(particularly when these offenders include the overwhelming majority of crimi-
nals). When officials wish to encourage confessions, they may therefore skew
the baseline by punishing too severely defendants who do not confess. No one,
not even the officials, may realize it has happened. One can no longer know
the "normal" punishment or what punishment would have been imposed in a
regime without bargains in leniency. If the vanished counterfactual baseline
could be discerned, few apparent promises might prove beneficial.58
Second, even if the distinction between threats and promises could be
intelligibly drawn in practice, both threats and promises depart from normal
expectations of just and appropriate criminal punishment. Punishment ought to
turn on what an offender did and on her personal characteristics, not on acci-
dents of fortitude, strategy, and what deal she can make.59 If the appropriate
moral baseline is sentencing "on the merits," both threats and promises diverge
from it.
60
Third, promises of leniency, particularly when coupled with intimations
that conviction is certain, are likely to generate false confessions. Richard Leo
and Richard Ofshe have presented chilling evidence of this fact,6' and they
were not the first to notice it. For two centuries before the Supreme Court
turned things around, English and American judges rested their condemnation
of promises of leniency on precisely this danger. An English court explained
in 1783, "[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by
the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape ... that no credit ought
to be given to it."62 As I have noted, police methods that are likely to pro-
duce unreliable confessions merit constitutional condemnation for the same
reason that suggestive police line-ups do.63
Focusing on improper police methods rather than on defendants' states of
58. So long as the number of defendants who resist the pressure to confess remains small,
increasing their punishment need not be costly. One can only guess, for example, whether legisla-
tures and sentencing commissions would have set the same minimum and guideline sentences if
promises of leniency had provided no escape hatch and taxpayers truly were required to pay the
costs of imposing these sentences on all convicted offenders. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REv. 652, 658-60, 687-89 (1981) (offering a fuller
assessment of the difficulty of discovering an appropriate baseline and of separating threats from
promises).
59. For a discussion of the strained rationales sometimes offered for rewarding confes-
sions--for example, the claim that even confessions prompted by promises of leniency manifest
remorse--see id. at 661-83, 718-23.
60. This argument raises the question whether the law of coercion can properly be used to
condemn practices that are offensive for reasons other than their harmful effects on offerees. For
example, could an offer that benefited a suspect be regarded as coercive because it was incompati-
ble with the public interest or with sound principles of justice? The case of a confession induced
by a large cash bribe may suggest an affirmative answer. When a suspect has sought to escape the
consequences of an offensive agreement, courts may not pause to consider just why the agreement
is offensive. Moreover, departures from desert-based sentencing seem inconsistent with the dignity
of defendants as well as harmful to the public. (Of course a defendant who was less interested in
his dignity than in the size of his bank account or the length of his sentence might not appreciate
my concern).
61. Richard Ofshe & Richard Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Ir-
rational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 979, 994-96 (1997).
62. Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 255 (Cr. Cas. 1783).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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mind could lead courts in two directions, one less supportive of the
defendants' claims and the other more supportive. The first direction is illus-
trated by a California Supreme Court decision, People v. MacPherson,"
whose grisly facts focus the issue sharply.
Robert MacPherson, who was in custody on a robbery charge, had made
no statements to the police. Then Jack Gruber, his cousin and roommate, was
arrested and charged with a murder that MacPherson himself had committed.
Apparently Gruber's arrest was supported by probable cause and made in the
good faith belief that he was the killer. Following Gruber's arrest, MacPherson
told Gruber's lawyer that he would, if necessary, confess to save his cousin.
Two months passed before the critical events, which are described in the
court's opinion as follows:
[Diefendant, who was still in isolation in his cell at the Alameda
County jail, jammed a pointed pencil into the orbit of his left eye,
and then repeatedly banged his head against the cell wall in an effort
to drive the pencil in deeper. Several police officers ran into his cell
to prevent him from further injuring himself. They grabbed his arms
and legs and carried him to his bunk. While he was lifting defendant,
Sergeant Parker heard defendant say, "Gruber didn't do it. I did."
Defendant lay quietly on his bunk for a few moments and then sud-
denly became violent and had to be subdued again. Officer Heiling
grabbed his arms and held defendant in an armlock on the floor.
Defendant then whispered: "I killed him; I killed him."
The California Supreme Court said, "A confession is involuntary unless it is
'the product of a rational intellect and a free will."' It held that the trial
court should not have received MacPherson's statements.
The issue in MacPherson was not the propriety of the police conduct,
which apparently left little room for improvement. Nor was it the reliability of
MacPherson's confession.67 The court excluded this confession because, with
a pencil in his eyeball, MacPherson was in no position to make a rational
choice. He could not knowingly and voluntarily have waived his right to re-
main silent.
Contrary to the impression conveyed by countless repetitions of the
Miranda warnings, however, the Constitution does not provides a right to
remain silent that a suspect must knowingly waive. It guarantees a right that
almost no one would waive, the right to be free of compulsion.' MacPherson
was subjected to no governmental compulsion; no government officer improp-
erly influenced his choice. Instead, MacPherson's conscience apparently would
not let go of him because of the evil that he was bringing upon his cousin, and
64. 465 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1970).
65. MacPherson, 465 P.2d at 19-20.
66. Id. at 20 (quoting In re Cameron, 439 P.2d 633, 639 (Cal. 1960), and Blackburn v. Ala-
bama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
67. I see little reason to doubt the truth of the defendant's statements, and even if I did, I
would see little reason to take the reliability issue from the jury.
68. As I have argued elsewhere, even the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), is compatible with this view of the Constitution. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 2629-30.
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he ultimately became deranged. The California Supreme Court instructed
MacPherson to go back, regain his senses, consult a lawyer, reconsider his
improvident action, and make his choice as a matter of rational litigation strat-
egy. Neither sound policy nor the Constitution required giving him this second
chance.
Fred Inbau, whose police interrogation manual was exhibited in the
Miranda opinion like a relic from a medieval torture chamber,' has argued
that the norms of polite persuasion in the parlor should not extend to the inter-
rogation room.7" Supreme Court opinions suggest, however, that in some re-
spects American confession law has taken the opposite tack. This law some-
times seems to rest on an etiquette more refined than Mrs. Astor's.7
Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe reveal that Inbau-endorsed tactics of the
sort not ordinarily seen in polite society better characterize the interrogation
process than the restraint prescribed in some of the cases. The backroom of
the stationhouse is still the scene of rough-and-tumble struggle.72 After sus-
pects waive their Miranda rights (and more than three-quarters do"), police
officers press hard for confession. They disparage, they disbelieve, they ridi-
cule, and they lie. They lie about their own beliefs, about the role of defense
lawyers, about victims, about the evidence, about the power of their technolo-
gy, about what could happen to the suspect if he does not confess, and about
what could happen to him if he does.74 Miranda, moreover, may have made
69. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-55.
70. Fred E. lnbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& PoL. ScO. 16 (1961).
71. Before asking a question, an officer must say, "May 1?," and receive an affirmative
answer. He must inform an arrested person of his rights even when this person already knows
them. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. He also must afford the arrested person access to an advisor,
one who may be provided graciously without charge. Id. at 472-73. If the arrested person says,
"I'd rather not," the officer must retire for a time. Then, if he does so politely, he may ask the
arrested person to reconsider. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). If, however, the arrested
person says "I'd like to see a lawyer," the officer may not request reconsideration, however long
the officer waits and however polite his request. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Most
of all, an officer must not be indelicate-for example, by mentioning the desirability of burying a
murder victim while the murderer is present his lawyer is not. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977). These rules of civility are found, not in the works of Emily Post, Amy Vanderbilt, and
Miss Manners, but in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States.
72. In the post-Miranda era, the refinement of the mansion has proceeded to the doorway of
the gatehouse but no farther. See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of
American Criminal Procedure, in YALE KAMISAR ET AL., CRIMINAL JusTICE IN OUR TIME 19
(A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). When Miranda, the housekeeper, arrived from the mansion, she
did not in fact clean the gatehouse. She did a little light dusting and moved an attractive rug over
the dirt.
73. See Paul G. Cassell & Brett S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REv. 839, 859 (1996) (84% of 129 interrogated sus-
pects in Salt Lake County waived their Miranda rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRImINoLOGY 266, 286 (1996) (78% of the suspects in 182 directly
observed or recorded police interrogations in California waived their Miranda rights, and prior
record was the only statistically significant predictor of their choices: "[Wlhile 89% of the sus-
pects with a misdemeanor record and 92% of the suspects without any record waived their
Miranda rights, only 70% of the suspects with a felony record waived their Miranda rights.").
74. As Welsh White notes, the prevalence of police deception is evidenced both by its fre-
quent appearance in reported cases and by the importance that police interrogation manuals afford
it. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 581-82
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American courts less attentive to the abuses that occur once its formalities
have been observed."
The interrogating officers ordinarily get what they want. Leo and Ofshe
describe an interrogation process so relentless that it easily can, and with
surprising frequency has, produced false confessions. They note:
Interrogators commonly claim that they have witnesses, fingerprints,
hair, blood, semen or other evidence when they have little or nothing.
Whether revealing evidence or telling lies, the interrogator labors to
convince the suspect that the case against him is so overwhelming
that he has no choice but to face the fact that he has been caught,
will shortly be arrested, successfully prosecuted and severely pun-
ished. This sets the stage for eliciting an admission of guilt in ex-
change for the smallest of benefits.76
Officers attempting to undermine a suspect's confidence in his innocence
may tell him that a "proton/neutron test" has established that he handled in-
criminating evidence or that a polygraph examination has revealed his "uncon-
scious" knowledge of the crime. They may inform him that it is time to decide
how he will be viewed in court and that his best opportunity to save himself
soon will be gone. They may intimate that only a truthful confession will
bring their interrogation to an end. And they may tell the suspect, "All we
really want to know is whether you planned to do this or whether it was an
accident.""
False confessions occur primarily in two situations-first, when police
officers convince suggestible suspects that they committed crimes that they
failed to remember until prompted and, second, when interrogating officers
convince innocent suspects that they will certainly be convicted and that things
will go better for them if they confess. Concocted evidence is usually essential
(1979) [hereinafter cited as White, Police Trickery]. Among the many examples of police decep-
tion cited by White are Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (obtaining confes-
sion after falsely telling a suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of the crime);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (obtaining confession after falsely telling a suspect that
another suspect had named him the gunman); United States ex rel. Galloway v. Fogg, 403 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (misrepresenting the extent to which other people had implicated the
suspect); Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1974), affid mem., 523 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1975) (telling a suspect that the murder weapon had been recovered when it had not); State v.
Cobb, 566 P.2d 285 (Ariz. 1977) (telling a suspect that his fingerprints had been found at the
scene of the crime when they had not). For descriptions of many more reported cases in which the
police obtained confessions by misrepresenting the incriminating evidence, see Deborah Young,
Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1996).
75. Louis Michael Seidman notes that the Supreme Court has rarely found confessions invol-
untary in the post-Miranda period and that "lower courts have adopted an attitude toward
voluntariness claims that can only be called cavalier." Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and
Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REv. 673, 745-46 (1992). He concludes, "Miranda ... is best characterized
as a retreat from the promise of liberal individualism brilliantly camouflaged under the cover of
bold advance." Id.; see also Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375,
385 (1997) (doubting that "Miranda has done anything to eliminate or reduce the mental coercion
police employ to persuade suspects to incriminate themselves").
76. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The
Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 STUD. iN L., POL. & Soc'Y 189, 198
(1997).
77. See id. at 196-203.
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to producing false confessions in both situations.78
Leo and Ofshe reveal not only the power of police interrogation but also
its susceptibility to judicial control. Interrogations follow clear patterns and
generally employ a small number of well understood persuasive techniques. If
a coerced confession is, as I have said, a confession caused by offensive gov-
ernmental conduct, the Constitution requires judges to review these persuasive
techniques, to decide which techniques are too dangerous or unfair to use, and
to exclude all confessions that the improper techniques produce. In the course
of this review, judges can develop at least a few categorical rules; they need
not look only to the "totality of the circumstances." '79
In developing rules for police interrogation and in assessing the totality of
the circumstances of particular cases, courts should pay attention to Fred
Inbau. When a crime was unwitnessed and the police seek to bridge the gap
between probable cause for arrest and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they
cannot be Mrs. Astor.' In some circumstances, they should be allowed to
express false sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, play on the suspect's
religious feelings, reveal incriminating evidence that in fact exists, confront the
suspect with inconsistent statements, and more.
Unlike the current Supreme Court, however, Professor Inbau supports the
traditional prohibition of threats and promises, and he does so on the ground
that these techniques pose an intolerable danger of causing innocent suspects
78. See Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Un-
trustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 109 (1997) [hereinafter cited as White,
False Confessions); GiLsi H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY 228 (1992). In addition, "[mlental health experts have long been aware of the
risk that a mentally retarded suspect's eagerness to please authority figures will lead him to con-
fess falsely." White, False Confessions, supra, at 123. Some innocent suspects confess primarily
to "escape from a stressful or an intolerable situation," see GuDJONSSON, supra, at 228, and some
disturbed and/or attention-seeking people confess falsely even without prompting by the police.
See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For an indication of the frequency of known false confessions (no more than the tip of an
iceberg), see White, False Confessions, supra, at 108-09 & nn.26 & 29 (citing a number of stud-
ies including Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 57 thl.6 (1987) (reporting "coerced or other false confes-
sion[s]" responsible for erroneous convictions in 49 out of 350 miscarriages of justice in potential-
ly capital cases)); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard F. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Con-
fessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interro-
gation (May 30, 1997) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Soci-
ety Association, St. Louis, Missouri) (discussing 34 "proven" false confessions, 18 "presumed"
false confessions, and eight "highly probable" false confessions).
79. See State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 73 (Haw. 1993) ("[DIeliberate falsehoods... which
are of a type reasonably likely to... influence an accused to make a confession regardless of
guilt will be regarded as coercive per se, thus obviating the need for a 'totality of circumstances'
analysis of voluntariness."). Examining the totality of the circumstances in every case makes "ev-
erything relevant and nothing determinative." See Joseph Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the
Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 243
(1986).
I advocate in this article the same sort of low-level generalization about recurring situations
that I have advocated. for the resolution of search and seizure and sentencing issues. See Albert W.
Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 227 (1984); Albert
W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 901 (1991).
80. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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to confess.8 Leo and Ofshe have shown him right. 2
In addition to resurrecting Brain in the stationhouse (if not in the court-
room where prosecutors rather than police officers promise leniency in ex-
change for admissions of guilt83), courts should forbid falsifying incriminating
evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect.
8 4
Especially when suspects are retarded or easily suggestible and when decep-
tion is coupled with intimations that leniency will follow confession, this mis-
representation is likely to generate false confessions.' In addition, fabricated
evidence is well designed to terrify innocent suspects who resist confession;'
lying during interrogations may desensitize or habituate officers to other dis-
honest practices; 7 and deception may breed mistrust for the police, limiting
81. Inbau, supra note 70, at 16.
82. See supra notes 61-63, 72-77 and accompanying text.
83. See Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 303, 310 (1987) (arguing that although plea bargaining should be permitted when
the accused is represented by counsel and can properly evaluate what is being offered, "[p]romises
of leniency from the police during interrogation are too likely to be deceptive, and too likely to
give even an innocent suspect the impression that confession is the only way to escape conviction
or mitigate the punishment").
84. See State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (requiring the exclusion
of a confession whenever the police have falsely represented that the defendant's guilt has been
established by scientific evidence). But see White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 583 (noting
that the United State Supreme Court "has neither held nor even indicated that any particular type
of police trickery would, in and of itself, render a resulting confession inadmissible"); Christopher
Slobogin, Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) ("[Clurrent consti-
tutional doctrie... by and large has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanctioned, police decep-
tion during the investigative phase."); Young, supra note 74, at 426 ("Mhe courts regularly admit
confessions obtained by police lying.").
Young notes that in its inception and for a century thereafter the requirement of
voluntariness was considerably more demanding than it is today. Young, supra note 74, at 433-51.
She cites, for example, United States v. Cooper, 25 F. Cas. 629 (D.C. Va. 1857) (No. 14,864), in
which the court held a confession improperly obtained because the investigating magistrate told
the suspect, "It is a very plain case. You might as well confess the whole matter. It will not make
the case any worse for you." Young, supra note 74, at 436 (quoting Cooper, 25 F. Cas. at 630).
85. Although the discussion in text focuses on the empirical consequences of police decep-
tion, lying also raises deontological concerns that should at least cast the burden of justification on
the defenders of deceptive interrogation. See SIssELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOIcE IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LIFE 30 (1978) ("[W]e must... accept as an initial premise Aristotle's view that
lying is 'mean and culpable' and that truthful statements are preferable to lies in the absence of
special considerations. This premise.. . places the burden of proof squarely on those who assume
the liar's perspective."); id. at 33 (attributing to St. Augustine the view that "God forbids all lies").
86. The leading police interrogation manual declares that officers should use the manual's
methods only when a suspect is "known or strongly believed to be guilty." FRED E. INBAU ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986). When a suspect is certainly and
provably guilty, however, there is no need to interrogate him. Cf. ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS
AT NOON 89 (1941) ("If you have all the proofs, why do you need my confession?"). Despite the
view of police officers that they know whether the people they question are guilty, see Tom Bark-
er & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass:" Some Conceptual Notes
on Police Lying, II DEVIANT BEHAV. 61., 68 (1990), one cannot assume that the use of any inter-
rogation technique will be limited with rare exceptions to criminals. But see Slobogin, supra note
84 (relying on Sissela Bok's analysis of permissible deception to argue that false claims of incrim-
inating evidence during interrogation are ordinarily unobjectionable because suspects arrested on
probable cause qualify as "publicly declared enemies").
87. Sissela Bok speaks of "the great susceptibility of deception to spread, to be abused, and
to give rise to even more undesirable practices." Box, supra note 85, at 26-27. The courts' ap-
proval of some forms of police deception in the "war on crime" may affect the attitudes of offi-
cers toward other forms-deception, for example, in warrant applications, courtroom testimony,
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their ability to secure the cooperation of suspects, other citizens, and jurors
who may be tempted to "send them a message.""8 In Frazier v. Cupp, 9 a
police officer falsely informed a suspect that his companion had confessed.
The Supreme Court held that the officer's misrepresentation "while relevant,
[was] insufficient ... to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissi-
ble." Material fraud vitiates most of life's choices, and although some forms
of police deception can be appropriate,9 permitting false claims of incrimi-
internal affairs investigations, and requests for permission to search. See Carl B. Klockars, Blue
Liei and Police Placebos: The Moralities of Police Lying, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 529, 533-34
(1984); Jerome Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUSTICE ETHIcs, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40,
45; Young, supra note 74, at 464 ("[T]he justification of lying to enemies may extend beyond the
interrogation room. Law enforcement officers may view prosecutors, judges, and even jurors as
enemies, or at least as obstacles.").
88. Bok observes:
The veneer of social trust is often thin. As lies spread ... trust is damaged. Yet trust is
a social good to be protected just as much as the air we breathe or the water we drink.
When it is damaged, the community as a whole suffers; and when it is destroyed, soci-
eties falter and collapse.
BOK, supra note 85, at 26-27.
Christopher Slobogin writes:
Routine deceit coarsens the liar, increases the likelihood of exposure and, when exposed,
maximizes the loss of trust. When the deceptive practice is carried out by an agent of
the government, it is even more reprehensible, both because the liar wields tremendous
power and because government requires trust in order to be effective.
Slobogin, supra note 84, at 62; see also Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies and Interrogation, 3 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 3 (1995); Young, supra note 74, at 455-75.
Admittedly, many of the harmful consequences produced by misrepresenting the strength of
the evidence are also produced by deceptive interrogation practices that I do not disapprove. See
infra note 91. These troublesome consequences are in fact risked by every form of undercover
investigation.
89. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
90. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 739.
91. Falsely expressing friendship or sympathy for a suspect, falsely suggesting that the vic-
tim deserved her fate, and even confessing falsely that the interrogating officer himself had con-
sidered or engaged in misconduct of the sort alleged seem less offensive than concocting nonexis-
tent incriminating evidence. See INBAU Er A.L., supra note 86, at 98-100. Such tactics seem un-
likely to terrify innocent suspects or to induce false confessions.
For example, I do not quarrel with (and indeed applaud) the tactics that J. J. Bittenbinder, a
former Chicago Police detective, told me that he employed in a case in which one reputed mobster
was arrested for killing another. Bittenbinder opened the door of the room in which the suspect
was held and shouted, "Man, I want to shake your hand! I've been hoping that someone would
get rid of that sonofabitch for us! We've been trying for years, but we never got close to him. I
hear you shot the bastard four times, is that right?"
"No," the apparently puzzled suspect said. "Only once."
"Thank you," said Bittenbinder as he left the room.
Misrepresenting nonincriminating facts to trip-up apparently dissembling suspects seems
unobjectionable in many circumstances. Even misrepresenting the existence of physical evidence
may be unobjectionable when the police do not claim that this evidence incriminates the suspect.
For example, the false statement, "We found the gun and the lab will soon test it," seems less
troublesome than the false statement, "We found the gun, and the lab report says that your
thumbprint is on it." Although the former statement would be likely to discomfit the guilty, an
innocent suspect would probably view it as welcome news. The latter statement, by contrast, could
lead an innocent suspect either to doubt her own innocence or to believe that the police were
trying to frame her.
I do not object to all forms of undercover interrogation--"deception about whether an
interrogation is taking place." See White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 602-08. After a right
to counsel at interrogation has attached, prohibiting undercover interrogation may be necessary to
safeguard this right; in this situation, perhaps the right-to-counsel tail must wag the interrogation
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nating evidence exempts the police not only from the rules of the parlor but
also from bedrock concepts of decency. 92
Welsh White, one of America's most thoughtful students of police interro-
gation, would go less far than I would in forbidding promises of leniency and
misrepresentations of incriminating evidence,93 White, however, has proposed
another limitation on police interrogation that courts should consider essential
to constitutional fairness. They should interpret the Due Process Clause to es-
tablish a maximum period of police interrogation (White suggests five hours),
and every suspect should be informed at the outset that questioning will con-
tinue no longer.9' The period of interrogation should, moreover, be shorter for
juveniles and mentally retarded suspects.95 The longer-than-five-hour interro-
gations that some courts have allowed" are likely to indicate to suspects the
dog. Nevertheless, the interrogation that occurred in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), in which a defendant's confederate agreed to "wear a wire" while the two were at liberty
pending trial, seems intrinsically no more objectionable than other, routinely accepted forms of
undercover investigation. The interrogation in Massiah did not frighten or inconvenience the de-
fendant, and the interrogation posed little risk to the innocent This interrogation did invade the
defendant's privacy, but only after probable cause had been established. Some techniques of un-
dercover interrogation, however, should certainly be condemned--for example, securing a
suspect's confidences by pretending to be a priest or a court-appointed defense attorney.
I disagree with Welsh White that the police should never be allowed to minimize the seri-
ousness of a suspect's alleged offense or to portray themselves as acting in the suspect's interest.
See White, Police Trickery, supra note 74, at 611-17. Misrepresenting a suspect's legal rights,
however, merits unqualified condemnation. If legal rights are to be meaningful, they must be
known and understood. Law enforcement officers should not be able effectively to repeal these
rights by persuading people that they do not exist See Commonwealth v. Dustin, 368 N.E.2d
1388 (Mass. 1977) (requiring the exclusion of a confession obtained through a false assurance that
only statements given by a defendant under oath at trial could' be used against him); Common-
wealth v. Starr, 406 A.2d 1017 (Pa. 1979) (requiring the exclusion of a confession when the po-
lice misrepresented the admissibility of polygraph results).
Some writers condemn all police misrepresentation in the interrogation of suspects, and
they offer potent arguments in support of this position. See Paris, supra note 88; Young, supra
note 74.
92. Without asserting that her analogy to police interrogation is exact, see supra text accom-
panying note 1, Deborah Young notes, "We would be shocked... if a doctor presented false test
results to obtain a patient's consent to surgery." Young, supra note 74, at 470; see also Colorado
v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 n.8 (1987) (stating that, in some situations, the Supreme Court "has
found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a suspect's waiver of the
Fifth Amendment privilege"). But see INBAU ET AL., supra note 86, at 131 ("With all offenders, in
particular the nonemotional type, the interrogator must convince the suspect that not only has guilt
been detected, but also that it can be established by the evidence currently available or that will be
developed before the investigation is completed.").
93. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 149-53 ('[N]ot all confessions given as
a result of promises appear to be untrustworthy," but "[ilnterrogators should be prohibited from
making any statements likely to lead a reasonable person in the suspect's position to believe that
he may receive a significant benefit with respect to the disposition of his criminal litigation if he
confesses."); id. at 147-48 ("[Sltatements exaggerating the strength of the evidence against the
suspect... should not be absolutely prohibited.... On the other hand, specific misrepresenta-
tions designed to convince the suspect that forensic evidence establishes his guilt should be pro-
hibited.").
94. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 143-45. Cf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (Black, J.) (stating that a 36-hour interrogation is "so inherently coercive
that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom").
95. See White, False Confessions, supra note 78, at 142-43.
96. See, e.g., State v. Doody, 930 P.2d 440 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that the confession of a
17-year-old defendant during a nearly 13-hour interrogation was voluntary); State v. La Pointe,
678 A.2d 942 (Conn. 1996) (holding that a confession after more than nine hours of continuous
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only way to end their interrogators' badgering is to yield.97
The first step in implementing these rules (or any others) must be the one
urged by Glanville Williams, Yale Kamisar, Paul Cassell, and many oth-
ers-videotaping police interrogations.9" When interrogations are fair, this
process often generates powerful evidence for the prosecution. Jurors can view
tapes of competent, unruffled suspects confessing in matter-of-fact tones to
civilized interrogators. About one-third of all law enforcement agencies in
American jurisdictions of 50,000 or more use videotaping to record some in-
terrogations," and the agencies that do like it." In England, where a stat-
ute generally requires the recording of police interviews with suspects, a Royal
Commission concluded, "By general consent, tape recording in the police
station has proved to be a strikingly successful innovation providing better
safeguards for the suspect and the police officer alike.""' Two American
states require the recording of interrogations,'" but most police departments
resist the practice. The objections they voice do not include the one that moti-
vates them: They do not want judges, jurors, and the rest of us to see them do
just what Leo and Ofshe say they do.
We know how to fix the defects of our interrogation process, but appar-
ently no one wants to. Repair requires using the technology available to us to
learn what occurs inside interrogation rooms, examining the substance of
police interrogation practices rather than the ritual dance that precedes them,
and forbidding altogether many forms of governmental force, fraud, threats,
and promises. Defining coerced confession to mean a confession caused by
offensive governmental conduct could help to focus the issues. Nevertheless,
we apparently prefer symbols-litigation about Miranda niceties, judgments
interrogation was voluntary); People v. Kokoraleis, 501 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1986) (holding a
confession voluntary although made by a defendant with an I.Q. of 75 during a deceptive interro-
gation that lasted 13 hours); People v. Towndrow, 654 N.Y.S.2d 69 (App. Div. 1997) (holding
that a confession after 14 hours of interrogation was voluntary). I am grateful to Welsh White for
calling most of these cases to my attention.
97. One suspect who confessed falsely later compared his interrogation to "when I went in
for surgery." This suspect ultimately decided that the only way to persuade his interrogators to
"back off" was to agree with them. "Every time I answered, 'No,' they were getting close to my
face," he said. "One of the Detectives had bad breath." See White, False Confessions, supra note
78, at 143 & n.249 (citing Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAw., May 1993, at 58).
98. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Authentication of Statements to the Police, 1979 CRIM.
L. REv. 6; Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record,
66 GEo. L. J. 209, 236-43 (1977); KAMISAR, ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 132-36; Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 486-97 (1996);
Roscoe Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1017 (1934); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CoNvICrING THE INNOCENT
xvii (1932); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 130.4, at 39 (1975); UNIFORM
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 243 (1974).
99. See William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, NAT'L INST. OF
JUST.: RESEARCH IN BRIEF, Mar. 1993, at 2.
100. See WILLIAM A. GELLER, POLICE VIDEOTAPING OF SUSPECT INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND PRACTIcES-A REPORT TO THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 152 (1992) (stating that 97% of the agencies that videotape
confessions or interrogations consider the practice either very useful or somewhat useful).
101. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 26 (1993).
102. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587,
592 (Minn. 1994).
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about the totality of the circumstances (after we studiously avoid discovering
them), and metaphysical appraisals of which misguided suspects truly had free
will when they succumbed to Dirty Harry.
